Putting a Smile on

Your Soul:

Aristotle's Guide to the Best Life

Jonah Bossewitch

PHI 301 – Professor Sarah Broadie

Preceptor Jennifer Hawkins

January 19, 1995

Long before Snoopy pondered the secrets of ultimate bliss, Aristotle was hard at work trying to complete the sentence "Happiness is..." To be precise, Aristotle was actually trying to complete the sentence "Eudaimonia is..." which differs subtly, but significantly, from Snoopy's project. 'Eudaimonia' is the Greek word for 'the human good' or 'human flourishing' and although it is usually (mis)translated as 'happiness', it does not have very much to do with instant gratification, or a quick pleasure fix. While pleasure is certainly a component of Eudaimonia, it has more to do with the characterization of an individual's life over the long term. For example, Aristotle would never have agreed that "happiness is two different kinds of ice cream." Since, by definition, most people are interested in pursuing eudaimonia, they are also greatly interested in figuring out what it is, and how it is best achieved. Aristotle is no exception, and a good portion of his discussions on ethics revolve around this point.

Aristotle gives two complementary versions of happiness. In accordance with the function argument (NE 1098a16), Aristotle claims that "happiness is an activity; and activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property." (NE 1169a29). He also lists three components that are preconditions for engaging in happiness. "Certainly no one will dispute one division: that there are three ingredients which must all be present to make us blessed—our bodily existence, our intellectual and moral qualities, and all that is external." (Pol 1323a24) These ingredients alone do not guarantee happiness, but they must be present for us to bring happiness into being and truly flourish. Despite Aristotle's certainty that none could dispute his divisions, it is difficult to see how these three categories can be completely divorced from one another. Specifically, our intellectual and moral qualities often depend upon the external, and it is not obvious what type of distinction Aristotle is making. What does he mean by 'external goods'?

The presence of these three ingredients often depends upon good fortune, leaving happiness in fate's hands. However, Aristotle reminds us that man "is blessed and happy not on account of any of the external goods, but because of himself and what he is by his own nature. And for these reasons good fortune must be something different from happiness." (Pol 1323b24) Once fate grants an individual a bare minimum of blessings, it is up to him, through the activities of his soul, to create happiness for himself. While good fortune is necessary for happiness, alone it is not sufficient.

After enumerating these blessings, Aristotle proceeds to evaluate them, and compare them to each other. He finds that not all blessings were created equal. "But while there is general agreement about the three, there is much difference of opinion about their extent and their order of superiority." (Pol 1323a34) Aristotle considers the soul to be more precious than either the body or property, so it is no surprise that he values the "goods of the soul" over external goods. "External goods, being like a collection of tools each useful for some purpose, have a limit; one can have too many of them, and that is bound to be of no benefit, or even a positive injury, to their possessors. It is quite otherwise with goods of the soul: the more there is of each the more useful each will be." (Pol 1323a7) Once again we are faced with the question, do all blessings fit neatly into these categories, or is the soul sometimes nourished by external goods?

Aristotle considers a good soul to be the most precious blessing since the soul is the principle of action, the form of the organism. It is the seat of man's characteristic activities, including rationality, creativity, and morality. The soul's role is to provide the source of man's function, and this puts the soul in a position of utmost importance. It is easy to see why Aristotle placed the importance of bodily health and material possessions below the well being of the soul. At the same time, it does not seem right to lump all of the external goods into the metaphor of a limited tool. Aristotle seems to be driving at the idea that external goods alone will not lead to eudaimonia, but he downplays the fact that many of the goods of the soul happen to be external.

A good way to illustrate this point is to take a detour, and revisit the function argument. The function argument states that since the soul is the principle of life, a living creature's function will be a characteristic activity of its soul. One of the difficulties in applying the function argument is determining a creature's so called "characteristic activity." Imagine a species of plants whose roots grow away from water, instead of towards it. This behavior is one of this species's characteristic activities, although it results in many plants dying of thirst. We would not want to call this evolutionary glitch the plant's function, since excellence in this self- destructive behavior is horrible for the plant. While this example might sound a bit farfetched, it highlights a common ambiguity in the application of the function argument.

It does not take long for Aristotle to home in on the trait that he considers the characteristic activity of man. "And we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle." (NE 1098a13) Aristotle has always prized rationality above all other animal traits, and it is no surprise that he takes this activity to be the function of man. He does not consider other possibilities for this larger than life function, and neglects a popular alternative to reason—love. Many would agree that "the function of man is a certain kind of life," but they would insist that "this be an activity or actions of the soul implying a loving principle." Like reason, the capacity to love is also a characteristic ability of humans, and it is not obvious why the good life should bow to one instead of another. Aristotle leaves open the possibility of multiple excellences, and advises to "remain in conformity with the best and the most complete," but this does not completely resolve our problem. (NE 1098a17) For some, reason will always trump love as the prime function of man, while for others, the opposite will hold true. In any case, even according to those who believe that love is subservient to rationality, activities involving love which are performed excellently seem to be a necessary component of the human good. Both schools of thought, including Aristotle, would agree that the importance of love in a good life cannot be overstated.

The activity of loving can be divided into three categories: The love for an object, the love for an activity, and the love for another person. All of these types of love involve external goods, but they engage the soul at the same time. The external object is only a component, albeit a necessary one, of the activity. These types of external goods almost belong in a different category than land, slaves, and cattle. Objects of love are more than just tools, as they have the unlimited potential to give something back to the lover. The activity of loving, bridges the gap between the external and the internal.

Of the three types of love, the love for an object is closest to Aristotle's metaphor of a tool, as the fascination with objects often fades as quickly as it appears. However, as any die hard collector knows, some objects have an infinite appeal. Aside from collectors, many feel their lives would be incomplete without sunsets, waterfalls, or landscapes. These types of external goods clearly enhance the soul, as only the appreciation of beauty can. Beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, but the eye needs something to behold.

Love for an activity is also an interesting case, since it usually involves external goods, but not necessarily the same specific ones. A musician who loves to create music requires an instrument, but one guitar is often as good as the next (not always). The same goes for the painter, the writer, or the mathematician who require a brush and canvas, or pencil and paper, but not a particular set. This reflects the difference between a tool and an instrument: while a tool is inherently limited in usage, an instrument is only limited by the imagination of the user. Since many good activities of the soul require instruments, we are once again forced to recognize the link between soul goods and external goods.

Which brings us to the most interesting case of love, love for persons. Love for persons comes in many forms, love for relatives, teachers, friends, and of course, lovers, to name a few. Aristotle believed that "man is sociable by nature" and "is a political creature... whose nature is to live with others." (NE 1097b10, 1169b17) If these traits are in our nature, then they are engraved on our Aristotelian souls. According to the function argument, these activities are a critical aspect of the human good, and ought to be carried with excellence in conformity with rationality (or perhaps, loving). When it comes to this natural activity of the soul, other people are indispensable, and the goods of the soul inevitably overlap with external goods.

Aristotle acknowledges the importance of friends and calls them "the greatest of external goods." (NE 1169b10) He finds it strange "to make the blessed man a solitary; for no one would choose to possess all good things on condition of being alone" and concludes that "the happy man needs friends." (NE 1169b17) Even to indulge in "purely" intellectual activities, such as rational discourse, requires a companion. Moral virtues are meaningless without any other participants, and "a certain training arises from the company of the good, as Theognis remarks." (NE 1170a11) Aristotle distinguishes between friends and useful people, and we can understand this distinction as one between soul friends and body friends. Soul friends share ideas, emotions, and passions, while body friends share a needle, a bed, or "as in the case of cattle, feed in the same place." (NE 1170b13). While it is easier to see why Aristotle considers body friends to be external goods, it is more difficult to understand placing soul friends into that same category.

Straddling the boundary between internal and external, love helps us understand the intentions behind the term 'external goods'. At first, I did not feel right categorizing conscious individuals as external goods. People should not be thought of as tools, to be used for a particular end. Furthermore, the whole notion of internal goods being distinct from external goods is confusing, and this confusion distorts Aristotle's ranking of the blessings. I soon discovered that Aristotle was sensitive to this concerns, and his discussions on friendship reveal a sense of 'external goods' that differs from the tool metaphor.

When using the term 'external goods' Aristotle was primarily contrasting the factors in human life that are within our control, from those that are completely beyond it. A subclass of the external goods that are beyond our control are the tool-type external goods, and most of us have witnessed the dangers of their excess. Outside of this subclass, there also exist some external goods that are crucial for a flourishing life, and provide the individual's soul with healthy nourishment. However, by ranking these items below the purely intellectual and moral qualities, Aristotle cautions us not to become too dependant upon the outside world for our eudaimonia. Relatives die, friends move away, lovers have changes of heart, and all of these things happen without any way for us to prevent them. Aristotle advocates a self-sufficiency that is admirable coming from a man who is clearly living a blessed life, that many would have taken for granted.

It is important to remember that although external goods are ranked last, they are still on the list of indispensable blessings. Aristotle recognizes their importance, especially of the external goods that are inextricably wound up with soul goods, but he seeks to minimize our reliance on events that are beyond our control. The best man is one who takes charge of his own life, whatever obstacles fate puts in his way. The ideal life must involve external goods, but they should not dictate the ultimate happiness of an individual. Eudaimonia is not easy to come by, but neither should it be impossible for most of us to achieve. Aristotle would never have recommended that we stop loving, but he would have insisted that the only thing you can rely on in this world is yourself. Perhaps this is why he could not face the possibility that love is man's ultimate function. The prospect that our ultimate function might be beyond our control, is indeed a depressing thought. Then again, the thought that rationality might be our sole function, is not tremendously uplifting either. But enough with the pessimism, after all, this is eudaimonia we're talking about—and happiness must be possible somehow, right?

My soul pledges its honor, in conformity with excellence, that it has not violated the honor code while writing this paper.

Jonah Bossewitch