All the Time in the World

Jonah Bossewitch

PHI 301

Professor Sarah Broadie

December 7, 1995

Gazing up into the midnight sky, any soul with a shred of curiosity is assaulted by mysteries, puzzles and riddles as numerous as the stars. It is intriguing that our nature's are drawn towards insoluble problems whose solutions have no practical significance whatsoever. This fact has not changed since Aristotle's time despite the radical alteration of the conceptual lenses through which we currently view the world. Although most people are not usually comfortable discussing abstract metaphysical propositions, almost everybody has thought about them. Many of Aristotle's concerns and beliefs about the universe have been answered or "proven" one way or another, but they have always left in their place new questions to plague the next generation. Other issues have remained with us unchanged and unresolved to this day and these questions seem as eternal as the phenomenon they address.

How did the universe begin? Was it created, or has it always existed? Will it last forever, or will it come to an end? What is space? Is it bounded, or is it infinite in size? If it's bounded, what's outside of it? What about time? What is its relationship to space? Will time last forever? Are all of these questions meaningful, or are some vacuous? How are they related - which answers commit you to others? Throughout the history of mankind any religion worth its gods had a mythology that attempted to answer at least some of these questions. Philosophers too have naturally been compelled to endlessly ponder these questions "which lay claim to insight into what is beyond the field of all possible experiences."1 Aristotle was not the first Greek to propose solutions in this domain as is seen by his frequent refutation of competing theories. The interesting question is not whether his views are correct (whatever that means in this context) but whether his arguments are internally consistent.

First, however, we must explain what we mean by 'heaven'... (1) In one sense, then, we call 'heaven' the substance of the extreme circumference of the whole, or that natural body whose place is at the extreme circumference. We recognize habitually a special right to the name 'heaven' in the extremity or upper region, which we take to be the seat of all that is divine. (2) In another sense, we use this name for the body continuous with the extreme circumference which contains the moon, the sun, and some of the stars; these we say are 'in the heaven'. (3) In yet another sense we give the name to all body included within the extreme circumference, since we habitually call the whole or totality 'the heaven'

On the Heavens I.9, 278b10

It is clear from this explanation that we can treat the terms heaven, universe ,and world synonymously. The term heaven is defined as that which contains "the entirety of matter" and is "composed of all physical and sensible body." (On the Heavens I.9, 278a26/278b22) This definition excludes the possibility of possible worlds outside of ours. Aristotle takes the position that the world is finite (or bounded) and is completely contained within an outer sphere. This position combined with Aristotle's definition of the universe entails that there is not "and could never come to be, any bodily mass whatever outside the circumference." (On the Heavens I.9, 27a7) He then steps beyond this conclusion and also claims that "there is also no place or void or time outside the heaven." (On the Heavens I.9, 279a12). Thus, for any given slice of time, Aristotle believes that space is finite and constant.

Turning to the symmetrical question of the extent of time, we must back up a little and explore Aristotle's concept of time. He takes a very empirical stand on the nature of time and essentially equates it with movement, "for time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement." (Metaphysics XII.6, 1071b10) While it may be true that the only way to measure time is by observing movement (oscillations or circular motion in particular), to equate the two is a very strong move. It is also somewhat unsatisfying without a more detailed elaboration, and may cause trouble for Aristotle later.

Aristotle claims that it is impossible for time to "come into being or cease to be; for there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist." (Metaphysics XII.6, 1071b8) On this basis he also infers that "it is impossible that movement should either come into being or cease to be." (Metaphysics XII.6, 1071b7) The challenge to Aristotle at this point is not whether his two claims concerning the extent of space and time are correct. Kant's First Antinomy addresses the futility of such an attempt (unless, of course, you adopt his philosophy of space and time). But a careful reading of Kant reveals that Aristotle's position does not fit the Thesis ("The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards to space.") or the antithesis ("The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space.")2 Formulated in Kant's terminology Aristotle's position becomes "The world has no beginning and is infinite as regards time, but it is limited as regards space." Is it logically consistent to hold these two beliefs in conjunction?

An apparent flaw in Aristotle's reasoning lies in disanalogous treatment of time and space which is manifest (?ed) in one of two ways. Depending upon which belief is considered fundamental the arguments that support the eternity of time and the boundedness of space can each refute the other. If we treat the time's eternity as fundamental we can construct an analogous argument for space the contradicts Aristotle's position. It is impossible for space to come to an end for there could not be an inside and an outside if space did not exist. In other words, if space is contained, then it must be contained in something, and that something must also be space. If the argument flows this way it is a refutation of the belief that there is nothing outside of the heavens, not even time, place, or void.

On the other hand, if we treat Aristotle's conception of space as fundamental we can construct an analogous argument for time that also contradicts Aristotle's position. If there was nothing, not even time, before the coming into being or after the ceasing to be of the universe, then there could be a beginning and an end of time. This model of time demands the same leap of intuition that the outer sphere with no outer surface does, and is equally valid. The possibility of constructing syntactically identical propositions concerning time and space (by replacing time- words with space-words) suggests that Aristotle has contradicted himself. Can this be? Has our hero finally fallen to the ranks of mortals?

Syntactic equivalence is not enough to show that the same argument ought to be valid in separate cases. We also need to show that the semantic content of the argument does not differ in a way that justifies applying syntactically different arguments. For instance the claim that "love must be unbounded for if it were bounded it would not be love" is the same form as Aristotle's argument for the eternity of time. However, love and time are different types of things, not "made of the same stuff." Love is created by the mind and exists inside of it whereas time exists in the outside world independent of minds (at least according to Aristotle). If the nature of their differences is relevant (as it appears to be in this example), it might be logically valid to simultaneously hold that 'love is bounded' and 'time is eternal'. The question then becomes, are time and space different in a relevant way?

Returning to Aristotle's definition of time we recall that Aristotle equated time to movement (or at least attributed time to it). Movement is the motion of substance, and substance is composed of matter. Aristotle is not clear about his definition of space, but we can be certain that it is intimately related to matter. Whether matter occupies space, delimits space, or is equated with space can be bracketed for now. What is important is that there is a conceptual chain linking time and space suggesting that they share the same metaphysical status and are in fact "made of the same stuff." This allows us to justifiably ignore the semantic differences between Aristotle's two arguments and demand that they be syntactically identical if they are to be logically consistent. As we have shown, the two arguments are not syntactically similar and it is now Aristotle's turn to respond to our charge of inconsistency.

It is difficult to imagine a way for Aristotle to slip out of this tangle without abandoning, or at least significantly reinterpreting, one of his beliefs. Had his treatment concerning the extent of time been more comprehensive and less concise we might have found a way out this contradiction. Perhaps he had something in mind that did not get recorded on paper that would allow time to be treated differently than space. Of course, we also have to wonder how Aristotle would have reacted to current astronomical theories. He might have had no problem giving up his theory of the spheres, and with it the belief that the universe is finite. While it may be rewarding to speculate, in the end we can never know how Aristotle would have replied to our charges against him. What we can say with certainty is that, as his work stands, there is a glaring inconsistency in Aristotle's cosmology. Maybe he should have spent less time staring up into the heavens, but then again maybe he should have spent more.