"Beyond the Limits of Possible Experience"

Freedom vs. Determinism

According to Kant.

Jonah Bossewitch

PHI 304

Professor Beatrice Longuenesse

January 10, 1994

While many of the philosophical issues that Kant addresses are as old as humanity, Kant distinguishes himself with his unique framings of the problems, in addition to his proposed solutions to them. Kant's method is top down, systematic, and relentless, and this approach produces a dramatically diferent landscape than other philosophers who simply focus on an individual problem in a virtual vaccum. Typical philosophical questions are presented in an unconventional manner, forcing the reader to trace an idea back to its origins to make any sence of it. Indeed, some critics have argued that it is impossible to make any sence of certain parts of the First Critique, as the claim that it is internally inconsistent, and Kant does not even solve the problem he set out for himself. Either way, the effort involved in attempting to make sence of Kant significantly contributes to a general understanding of the problems he was grappling with, and this alone justifies the project.

The distinctivness of Kant's method is particularly apparent in the Antinomies of Pure Reason, which can be veiwed as the culmination of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although the cosmological questions provide Kant with an oppurtunity to apply his new system, Kant did not raise these issues on a whim. Kant argues that the cosmological ideas correspond to the four categories "which necessarily lead to a series in the synthesis of the manifold" (A415/B442) and therefore must neccisarily be addressed in the Critique. It is only natural for Kant to follow up the discussion of the "existence" of appearances with an investigation of the nature of those appearances. In fact, Kant claims that the nature of appearances can be completely determined by considering only four categories of ideas: (1) Composition, (2) Division, (3) Origination, and (4) Dependence of Existence. Within these four categories Kant places the well known disputes concerning the World, the ultimate building blocks of nature, Freedom, and God. For Kant, the cosmological ideas are directly related to the nature of appearances, and consequently a thourough understanding of appearances can be translated into an understanding of the cosmological ideas. Acccording to Kant, the Antinomies of Pure Reason are all illusions grounded in "the common but fallacious presupposition of the absolute reality of appearances," (A536/B564) and they can all be resolved by appealing to the conception of appearances proposed in the Analytic.

The fact that the Antinomies come up naturally in Kant's systematic account of Pure Reason, by no means diminishes their importance with respect to practical concerns. On the contrary, the seemless connection between the Antinomies and the Analytic demonstrates the enormous practical implications of the Analytic. The importance of the Antinomies, with respect to the logical use of reason as well as more practical concernsm, can not be overstated. The fact that Kant considered this to be true is reflected in a letter written to Garve, in which Kant states that "the Antinomy of Pure Reason awakened me from my dogmatic slumber." This assertion should not be taken lightly (especially coming from Kant), and it is clear that Kant viewed the Antinomies as an integral aspect of the Crituqe, as they completed the analylis of appearances, and at the same time liberated the reader from the illusions that arise from a faulty analysis. The beauty of the Critique is truly enhanced by the fact that a systemtic account of Pure Reason will inevitably have to address the metaphysical concerns which originally motivated Kant's investigation.

Although Kant refers to the Antinomies collectivly, it is clear from the text that he personally considered the Third Antinomy to be the most troublesome, and perhaps the most important. While Kant's treatment the Antinomies is generally indifferent, the solution to the Third Antinomy stands out because it seems as if Kant has a vested interest in its outcome. Only in the solution to the Third Antinomy does Kant go to such great lenghts to explore the ramifications of accepting the Thesis over the Antithesis, and vice versa. Although the original inquiry dealt with the origination of an apperance, namely the possiblity of transcendental freedom, Kant raises the issue of practical freedom in his solution to the Third Antinomy. While the two concepts are related according to Kant, it seems as if, strictly speaking, the problem of practical freedom does not belong in the Antinomies. The solution to the Third Analogy seems to raise more questions than it answers, including: What is the relationship between transcendental, practical, and psychological freedom? Why does Kant raise the issue of practical freedom in responce to the Third Antinomy? Does the issue of practical freedom even belong in the Critique of Pure Reason?

In its purest form, the Third Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas deals with the abstract problem of the origin of appearances. Kant asserts that "when we are dealing with what happens there are only two kinds of causality conceivable to us; the causality is either according to nature or arises from freedom" (A532/B560) where nature is understood as mechanistic causality, and freedom as "the power of beggining a state spontaneously." (A533/B561) The Thesis argues that appearances of the world can be derived from both types of causes, while the Antithesis maintains that "there is no freedom" and that appearances of the world can only be derived from the laws of nature. The proofs of the respective theses revolve establishing or refuting the nessecity of an absolute beggining of a series, and in particular, focus on the possibility of an absolutely first state of the world. Once any instance of spontenaity is shown to be possible, "it is now also possible for us to admit within the course of the world different series as capable in their causality of beggining of themselves, and so to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom." (A451/B479)

Both an absolute first state of the world and psychological or practical freedom are instances of transcendental freedom "in action." Although Kant beleives that "the transcendental idea of freedom does not by any means constitute the whole content of the psychological concept of that name, the practical concept of freedom is based on this transcendental ideal, and... the denial of transcendental freedom must, therefore, involve the elimination of all practical freedom." (A448/B476, A533/B561, A534/B562) In no uncertain terms, the Dialectic eliminates the possibility of practical freedom independent of transcendental freedom, contrary to what many philosophers, and even Kant himself in his later work, have argued. Futhermore, since Kant believed that "if there is no transcendental freedom, then threre can be no practical freedom," then the statement "if there is practical freedom, then there is transcendental freedom" is also true. As we have seen, since the Third Antinomy only addresses transcendental freedom, any instance of transcendental freedom will serve to resolve the Antinomy. If Kant can demonstrate the compatiblity of practical freedom with nature, the issue of an absolute first state is no longer essential to the Third Antinomy. In this respect, the issue of practical freedom is not peripheral to the Third Antinomy, as its function is to enable Kant to temporarily sidestep the question of an absolute first state, and resolve the Third Antinomy from a different, but equally valid, starting point. Nonetheless, the solution to the Third Antinomy could have proceeded with nothing more than a passing reference to practical freedom.

The Solution to the Third Antinomy Without Reference to Practical Freedom.

In contrast to the first two Antinomies, where Kant's solution involved showing that neither the Thesis nor the Antithesis were true, Kant's solves the Third Antinomy by demonstrating that the Thesis and the Antithesis can both be true simultaneously. He explains that "freedom is at least not incompatible with nature" (A558/B586), since freedom and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Kant believes that the only way to harmonize freedom and determinism is by saying "that in one and the same event, in different relations, both can be found." (A536/B564) Both relations can be found in the same event since it is possible "to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect merely an effect of nature and in another aspect an effect due to freedom." (A543/B571) Kant introduces the concept of the intelligible, which he defines as "whatever in an object of the sences that is not itself an apppearance." (A538/B566) Kant believes that it is possible for the intelligible to cause sensible effects, but "while the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature." (A537/B565) While Wood describes this solution as a "metaphysical monstrosity," (which is actually kind compared to Bennett's dismissal of Kant's theory as worthless) it is certainly possible to construct a coherent interpretation of Kant's solution to the Third Anology.

In order to fully understand the solution to the Third Antinomy, it is necessary to return to the Second Analogy. Not only does theSecond Analogy provide the conceptions of cause and effect used in the Third Antinomy, in it Kant prooves that "all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect," (B232) While on the surface the Second Analogy could be taken as a proof for the Antithesis, embeded in the subtlties of the Second Analogy lies the key to understanding the solution to the Third Antinomy. The proof of the Second Analogy is grounded in the fact that "experience itself -- in other words, empirical knowledge of appearances -- is thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and therefor all of alteration to the law of causality; and, as likewise follows, the appearances as objects of experience, are themselves possible only in conformity with the law." (B234) The reason that Kant claims that causality is a necessary condition for experience, is that the manifold of representations could never be synthesized unless the law of causality is assumed. In other words, even if transcendental freedom existed, a spontaneous effect would still be perceived as obeying the law of causality, or else it could never be experienced. The Second Analogy actually raises a very relevant epistemological concern, namely, Given an effect, how can we ever know if its cause was natural or spontaneous? According to the law Kant prooved in the Second Analogy, unless we hypothesize a natural cause for an effect that was actually caused spontaneously, we can never exprience it. Therefore, by definition, if transcendental freedom exists it must be intelligible.

While the Second Analogy forces us to regard appearances as having deterministic causes, we can still imagine an effect having an intelligible spontaneous cause. "Freedom, in this sence, is a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains nothing borrowed from experience , and which, secondly, refers to an object that cannot be determined or given in any experience." (A533/B561) From an empirical standpoint an effect must be caused by a preceeding state which, in turn, belongs to an infinite series of causes that must act in accordance with the Universal law of causality. At the same time, the effect may be veiwed from a metaphysical standpoint, in which the preceeding state of the cause need not belong to a series of causes, in which case we can imagine that the effect is grounded in a spontaneous cause. Just as in the other three antinomies the ugly root of the illusion in the Third Antinomy is "the common but fallacious presuposition of theabsolute reality of appearances." (A536/B564) If appearances are things in themselves, then the Second Analogy would have proved that the Universal Law of Causality applies to things in themselves, instead of merely appearances. Furthermore, there would be no extensions of the concept "intelligible" since there would be nothing in an object outside of experience, and this alone would eliminate the possibility of transcendental freedom. Exposing the flawed reasoning in assuming the absolute reality of appearances shatters the illusion of the Third Antinomy, and allows Kant to formulate a system in which freedom and determinism coexist in harmony.

What makes the Third Antinomy bizzare is that Kant does not stop after explaining how it can theoretically be resolved, and then applying this solution to the original problem of an absolute first cause. Instead, Kant continuues by applying the solution of the Antinomy to something from experience - human will. While it is logically valid to use the example of practical freedom to demonstrate his solution, the idea is strangely out of context in the Four Antinomies, especially since Kant rarely gives examples from experience no matter how complicated the theory. Kant may have been able to justify including the digression to practical freedom on the grounds that his solution is very extravagent and truly needed an example to facillitate a full understanding. On the other hand, given the importance that practical freedom plays in the rest of Kant's work, it is tempting to suspect Kant of inserting the discussion of practical freedom, even if it was not necessary. Since so much critisism is directed at Kant's account of practical freedom, one could speculate that Kant included the issue as a magnet for dialogue. It is doubtful that many people would have paid as much attention to the Third Antinomy had Kant not included a discussion of practical freedom in the solution, and Kant may have wanted to insure that everybody understood the tremendous consequences of the outcome of the Third Antinomy. If Kant's claim that practical freedom is dependent on the transcendental freedom is correct, every reader of the Critique has a personal stake in the resolution of the Third Antinomy. It is as if, after four hundred pages of abstract ideas, the Critique suddenly slaps you in the face and screams "This matters!" While the issue of practical freedom may not strictly belong in the disccussion of transcendental freedom, it certainly fits, and there are plenty of good reasons for Kant to have brough it up where he did.

Kant's analysis of practical freedom should have been a relitivley straightforward application of the resolution of the conflict between freedom and determinism, especially since Kant brought it up to clarify his solution. In fact, the issue of practical freedom probably generates more controversy than all of the other issues in the First Critique combined. According to Kants theory

Objections to the connection between trans & prac

The objections to Kant's solution to the Antinomy come in all shapes and sizes, ranging from those who find his approach sound but have problems with the details, to those who claim that the solution is internally inconsistent and completly incoherent. In between these extremes are the comentators who argue that Kant does not succeed in solving the problem that he set out for himself, and those who argue that if Kant's solution is correct then there never was an Antinomy to begin with.

In principal, idea of regarding a singular event from multiple perspectives is logically sound, and is analogous to the use reference frames in physics.

Problems:

simplistic account of causes: multiiple causes, circularity, probability -> chaos

sponteneity =? randomness