What Color is Evil?

An Investigation of the Analogy

Between Colors and Values.

Jonah Bossewitch

PHI 307

Professor Elijah Millgram

January 9, 1994

Over the years, the investigation of morals has taken many strange twists and turns in the quest to determine the source of moral authority. Although the only two possible sources for any authority are internal and external, the debate rages on. In a recent move to resolve this dilemma, philosophers have proposed a conception of morals that straddles the fence. Their claim is grounded in the fact that, the perception of some qualities depends on both internal and external factors. The paradigm example of such a quality is color, and although the question of how we perceive colors is far more complex than most people imagine, the fact that the perception of colors is response dependent, seems inescapable. After centuries of likening values to virtually everything from objects to emotions, philosophers began to wonder, what if values are like colors?

Many philosophers mistakenly believe that the analogy with colors actually simplifies the question of moral authority, since the authority is neither internal nor external, but something in between. This view unnecessarily postulates a mysterious third source of authority , since we can view the authority of colors simply as a combination of internal and external components. If this is the case, the analogy with colors actually complicates matters. Instead of only having to explain the nature of one source of authority, we are now in a position of having to explain the nature of both internal and external authority. However, although the analogy with colors may complicate matters, the idea was also responsible for one of the most important breakthroughs in contemporary moral theory - the idea that the perception of values is dependent on how we're built, or in formal terms, the structure of the agent (which I will abbreviate as S). This idea sprung from the realization that, just as the perception of colors is dependent on the S, the perception of values might be dependent on S as well. Some people see colors "normally," (i.e. the way most people do) some people are color blind, some people experience synesthesia, and in all probability, no two people experience colors in the same way. Similarly, if values are like colors, perhaps the perception of values is a function of S, in the same way that it is for colors.

It is tempting to accept this conclusion because on the surface it sounds plausible, and, in contrast to most other meta-ethical theories, this one it actually proposes a way to make progress in the field. If it is correct, then investigating S will how and why we make value judgements. However, before we rush off to begin this investigation, we better first carefully analyze the argument. So far, the explanation of the analogy between colors and values has been sloppy and vague. Until we have a better idea of how the two are similar, we have no right to infer that something that applies to one, also applies to the other. One thing is certain, and that is that colors and values must be disanalogous in some ways, or else the two concepts would be identical. Nobody ever intended to suggest that values are colors, only that they are similar in some ways. The revised question that we must now ask is: In what respects are colors and values analogous, and in what respects are they disanalogous?

Whether or not we like it, the answer to this question may show that we have no reason to believe that the perception of values is a function of S. If colors and values are disanalogous in a way that way that is related to why color perception is response dependent, we can not rationally infer that value perception is response dependant as well. By the same token, if we find that colors and values are disanalogous in a way that is related to the nature of what they respond to, we may discover that although the perception of both are a function of S, they are functions of different aspects of S. Such a discovery could heavily influence the direction and the nature of the investigation into the structure of agency.

The initial suggestion that colors are analogous to values was based on the idea that both are response dependent, which is equivalent to saying that perceiving them involves internal and external components. In all instances where perception relies, even in part, on inside authority, S is relevant. This is true since an investigation of S is really an investigation of the internal mechanisms involved in a given process. A more thorough understanding of S will lead to a better understanding of exactly what we mean when we say that the authority comes from the inside. In fact, the entire branch of reasoning that attributes moral authority to the inside, can benefit from an investigation of the S. For example, emotivists would gain if they could present a clearer picture of how emotions work, and the way that emotions work is an aspect of S. Although we don't need the analogy between colors and values to justify the dependence of values on the S, historically, philosophers only began to appreciate the importance of S after considering the case of colors. However, although it may be valid to claim that values are like colors since both are response dependant, values and colors differ fundamentally with respect to what they respond to. This fact turns out to be extremely relevant in determining which aspects of S ought to be investigated in order to gain a better understanding of the perception of values. Investigators of color perception are certainly not interested in the aspect of S that deals with emotions (although ultimately they might be), as they believe that differences in color perception can be explained by individual differences in people's visual systems. As we have hinted at with the two examples of different aspects of S, the structure of agency is a vast topic with many, many different aspects. If we are not cautious, we may find ourselves barking up the wrong tree, investigating an aspect of S that is relevant to color perception, but not to value perception.

Surface Qualities vs. Deep Qualities

One of the key ways in which colors differ from values is that, the quality we call color describes the surface properties of the object, but the quality we call value describes properties of the object that go deeper than the surface. This point is nontrivial, and can only be demonstrated through an analysis of the concepts in question. While it is correct to think that this analysis must involve an investigation of the meaning of color words and value words, "let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it. "1 Our problem with moral language is that, we seem to have "forgotten" the meanings that have been given to the words. The strange part is, that we continue to use these words even though we barely have a clue of what they mean. The only way to recover (or discover, as the case may be) this knowledge is by inferring it from observations of the usage of the words in question. As we shall find, the language of color is often used in a manner that the language of value is not. Furthermore, this usage is not accidental, as it is impossible to even conceive of using value words in some of the ways that color words are routinely used.

"Hmmm, I really like this plunger, but does it come in cyan?" This type of question is probably heard hundreds of times daily by most salesmen, and all of them (usually) understand exactly what the customer means. The customer is requesting an object (A) that is identical to another object (B) in every respect except for its color (and perhaps its price). When mail order catalogues specify that an item is available in melon, coral, moss, loden, putty, claret, oatmeal heather, ecru, and red,2 it is understood that they are selling items that are identical in every way except for color. Most people take for granted the fact that two objects can be different colors, but identical in every other way. However, this trait is not true of every quality, and as we shall see, there are even instances where it is not true of colors either. Things begin to get interesting when we ask, what is it about colors that allows us to treat them interchangeably?

A first response to this question might appeal to the physics of color. It would go something along the lines of "color is only skin deep". Since color is perceived because of the reflection of light off of the surface of an object, the outside of an object is the only part of an object responsible for the color perceived. Consequently, altering the color need not require an alteration of any part of the object below the surface. This way, the integral parts of the object, i.e. the characteristics that make it that object, can be preserved in a color change, and we can talk about an object changing colors without being changed in any other way.

This approach is doomed from the start, as its oversimplified account of the physics of color is just plain wrong. In his book Color for Philosophers, Hardin relentlessly proves that the physics of color are infinitely more complex than philosophers had ever previously imagined. "The number and variety of the physical properties of objects which influence their perceived color are surprisingly large."3 The fact of the matter is, the factors that cause us to perceive color are usually not caused by the surface of an object. Flames, neon lights, rainbows, sunsets, and oil slicks are just a few examples of objects that should convince us that this is the case. If it seems counter intuitive that the color of a "solid" object could be determined by its internal molecular structure, sorry, but to the best of our knowledge, that's the way the world works.

The claim that color is a surface quality can be salvaged by sidestepping the issue of physics. In the preceding argument the word surface was used in its mathematical sense, namely the boundary between the inside and the outside of an object. There is another sense of the word surface that allows us to understand why colors can be treated interchangeably. A surface quality can also mean a superficial quality, or more precisely, a quality which is not built in to the definition of object A. According to this claim, the language of colors is not intended to describe features of an object that are crucial in its identification. Since color words describe surface qualities, (in the superficial sense) the words can be used interchangeably when describing an object without altering the fundamental nature of the object being described.

It is important to recognize that the second argument is weaker than the first, since the first argument makes a claim about the intrinsic nature of colors, while the second argument merely makes a claim about how we use color words. Still, it is possible to object to the second argument on the grounds that there are counter examples to the claim that color words are always interchangeable. For example, if I walked into an auto parts store and asked the shopkeeper if he sold any brake lights in green, he would probably throw me out of the store for wasting his time. In the case of brake lights the color is not a surface quality, since the definition of a brake light includes the fact that it is red. We can also find many instances in nature where color has a deep meaning, and is used to communicate information. Bright colors, like red and yellow, are often danger signals indicating poison, and in many species, colors can indicate gender, or readiness to mate. There are still some remnants of this type of color use of in modern human society. For instance, to a member of a street gang, colors can indicate friend or foe, and can mean the difference between life and death. Finally, recent psychological research4 indicates that the colors of your environment can influence your mood, even if your not aware of their effect. While we have not yet incorporated this findings into our language, we can imagine a time in the future when colors become associated with moods, and cease to be interchangeably in certain contexts. These cases show that there are some uses of color that describe deep qualities of an object. Never the less, it is still valid to claim that most of the current usage of color language only describes surface qualities, and essentially carries no meaning.

While color language is primarily used to describe surface qualities, the same can not be said about values. Try to imagine a scenario in which the value language is interchangeably. Let's say that your trying to describe somebody to a friend of yours who does not know him. Could it ever make sense to say that he is exactly like an a**hole you both know, except that he is a nice guy? How about walking into a music store and asking if they have any good music that sounds exactly like "The New Kids on the Block." Would you ever send back the desert in a restaurant and insist that they serve you something that tastes just like it, only good? It seems as if value language is only used to describe deep qualities. What is going on here? Why can't value words be swapped the same way that color words can? Is this the fact that value words can't be swapped simply a issue of how we happen to use them, or is it impossible to even imagine a possible world in which value words describe surface qualities?

If all value language describes deep qualities, it is clear that value words can never be swapped. Since deep qualities are essential to the nature of the object, it is impossible to alter a deep quality without changing the object in a significant way. If this point is hard to accept, consider an analogy involving the predicates electrical and mechanical. Since machines are defined in terms of how they function, and these words describe the way that something works, these predicates describe "deep qualities" of machines. It completely incoherent imagine a musical instrument that is the exactly the same as a bass guitar, except that it is mechanical. Since the fact that it works electrically is an essential part of the object being a bass guitar, once the predicate "electric" is removed from the object, it ceases to be a bass guitar. Therefore, it would never be possible to swap the predicate "electric" for any other predicate, and still be referring to the same type of machine. Returning to the case of values, if all values describe deep qualities, then it is impossible, even in principle, for values to be interchangeable in the same way that colors are most of the time.