Jonah Bossewitch	Prof. Rosen

PHI 313	9/29/93

How do you know that?

To most people, the issue of what constitutes knowledge is not even an issue. People have an intuitive, common sense understanding of the verb "to know" without an explicit definition in mind when they use it. In fact, intelligent people communicate just fine and seemingly without ambiguity using only this intuitive concept of knowledge. In light of this it may appear to be a waste of time for philosophers to attempt a rigorous analysis of knowledge. However, even if there was nothing new to learn, the exercise of breaking down our current beliefs and attempting to explain them would be well worth our while. In the process of this ostensibly pointless exercise, many new truths and distinctions would become apparent. But it is arrogant to think that there is nothing new to learn about a concept just because it seems to be intuitively understood. We may have a vague notion of what it is to know something, but when it comes to drawing the fine line between what is and what is not knowledge, intuition may fail to clear things up. The process of making intuitive notions explicit by providing clear definitions of them is the domain of philosophy. If this still sounds pointless then bear in mind that sometimes, what distinguishes a philosopher from everybody else is a fascination with the obvious.

While the concept of knowledge may seem simple and obvious at first, it becomes very complicated very quickly. We can learn a lot about a concept by empirically observing the ways that a word associated with that concept is actually used in practice. The verb "to know" is very closely connected to knowledge, and by observing its usage we can learn much about the varieties of knowledge. The same word "know" is used in many contexts, however, it seems possible to group the types of knowledge into primary categories. "I know Tammy," "I know how to hangglide," and "I know that hanggliders have wings" are examples of some of the different senses of the word "know." We can only begin analyzing knowledge when we agree which variety of knowledge we are discussing. There are interesting arguments that attempt to enlarge or reduce the number of types of knowledge, by claiming, for instance, that knowing how to do something is nothing more than knowing that certain things are true. However, this issue is tangential and regardless of how it is resolved propositional knowledge, or knowing that something is true, is a very important type of knowledge. The following analysis will only consider this one type of knowledge.

Of all of the types of knowledge mentioned above, propositional knowledge sounds fairly straightforward. What does it take for somebody (let's call him S) to know something (let's call what he knows P)? Can we make the assertion that S knows P without using the word "know"? In other words, what conditions exist, such that if and only if those conditions were satisfied we could say that S knows P? As it turns out, such conditions are hard to specify, and we are constantly attempting to reconcile our intuitions about knowledge with our explicit definition of knowledge. We test the validity of our definition through the use of counter-examples. A counter-example is an imaginary case or thought experiment that demonstrates that either the definition is to stringent, and does not allow us to say that S knows P in a case where there seems to be knowledge, or that the definition is too lenient and allows for us to say that S knows P when it seems clear that S does not know P. It is important to remember that the following conditions are criterion for knowledge, not a method for determining what is and what is not knowledge.

The Standard Analysis of Knowledge.

Can there be knowledge of a false proposition? "What do you mean orange? I know that redhead's have red hair." In this instance, S is convinced that he knows P (the fact the redheads have red hair), and yet P happens to be false (they actually do have orange hair). Do we want to say that S knows P even if P is false? It is difficult to imagine a situation where P is false and our intuition tells us that S knows P. Therefore, our first condition we will stipulate that for S to know P, P must be true. This condition presupposes the existence of objective truth, and we freely admit that our definition of knowledge may require further discussion. Is the truth of P enough for me to say that S knows P?

Can there be knowledge without belief?	It is trivial to envision a case where the truth of P does not imply S knowing P. For if this were the case then it would be true that S knows everything that is true. We are missing a critical element of our definition of knowledge that our intuition might describe as S knowing that he knows P. But we our not allowed to use the word know in our definition of knowledge. If we instead insist that P is aware of the truth of P, or believes in the truth of P, it seems that the spirit of our intuition is preserved.

The issue of belief in P being a necessary condition for knowledge of P is not as clear cut as the condition requiring P to be true. For instance, take the case where my girlfriend dumped me and I am in a state of denial. We would like to say that I know that I have been dumped, however, when asked I will deny that I have been. Do I know that I have been dumped? Is this then an instance of knowledge without belief? This type of objection to the requirement of belief for knowledge can be dealt with by deciding to define belief as belief on some level, for it seems fair to say that some portion of my mind believes that I have been dumped. We can then leave it to the psychologists to resolve where that belief resides. We can also make the distinction between tacit belief and explicit belief. I know that pandas have intestines even though I have never previously thought to myself that they do. My belief is based on my explicit knowledge that all animals have intestines, and that a panda is a type of an animal. This type of belief, namely believing something that is implied by explicit beliefs, is called a tacit belief. A later analysis of belief will have to take into account tacit and explicit beliefs. For now, it is enough to add the condition that S must believe P to be true in order for S to know P. Assuming that these arguments have been resolved is there anything that distinguishes true belief from knowledge?

How about justified true belief? Take the case of a mad man on a street corner preaching that everybody in New York will be annihilated if they do not repent. At the same time a terrorist organization has obtained a nuclear device and decides to blow up New York to prove a political point. The mad man really believed that New York would be destroyed, and in fact, New York was destroyed. Did the mad man therefore know that New York was going to be destroyed? It seems that our analysis of knowledge as a true belief is too lenient and allows instances where there seems to be no knowledge to be considered knowledge. The standard analysis of knowledge, adds the third condition, that S must be justified in believing P, to the first two. In this usage justification means behaving reasonably and responsibly with respect to the evidence. In this case, assuming that the mad man did not know of the terrorist plot, the mad man is not justified in believing that New York will be destroyed and therefore does not know. According to the standard analysis of knowledge S must have a justified true belief in order for S to know P, and so according to the standard analysis the mad man in this case did not know that New York was going to be destroyed.

Beyond the standard analysis. Is the standard analysis sufficient? To show that it is not we must come up with an example of a case where there is justified true belief, and yet, no knowledge. Gettier first raised such a counter-example in 1963 and the analysis of knowledge has yet to be resolved.

While baking a batch of cookies, a typo in the recipe leads John to mistakenly believe that the cookies will be ready in twenty minutes. Just as twenty minutes are up the phone rings and John says "either my cookies are done, or I am about to win free tickets to India." By some very bizarre coincidence the phone call was somebody offering him free tickets to Bombay. At the same time the cookies are not yet cooked, but the "or" in John's assertions allows for the assertion to be true if only one of the propositions is true. Did John know that he was going to win tickets to India? John believed that "the cookies are done or that he was going to win free tickets," and this statement is true since he did win free tickets. John was also justified in believing it since the recipe said the cookies would be ready in twenty minutes. According to the standard analysis of knowledge we would be forced to say that John knew that he was going to win a free trip. What makes us hesitate to call this case of justified true belief knowledge? It has to do with the fact that John is relying on justification that leads him to believe a true proposition and then inferring a weaker proposition from the original one. The weaker proposition turns out to be true, while the original proposition, which is what John based his justification on, is false.The best way to close the hole in our definition of knowledge is still being debated. Just how many more conditions do we need to add in order for cases such as this not to be considered knowledge? As of today, nobody is sure.

What condition should we add to knowledge that will allow us to say that John did not know that he was going to win tickets to India? One such condition is proposed by Harman and is based on the implicit reasoning that one goes through in making an inference. Harman actually stipulates this condition in order to account for a different class of counter-examples, however his condition takes care of Gettier cases as well. We need to look at the steps that one goes through in making an inference and each step of the inference must satisfy the following condition: "One may infer a conclusion only if one also infers that there is no undermining evidence that one does not possesses." Such a bit of information is called a defeater. The argument that John does not know that he was going to win tickets to India goes as follows: John believed that the cookies would be done twenty minutes because it said so on the box and that the box would only report true information. However, this conclusion has a defeater since there is evidence that John does not possess that the box had a typo, perhaps the original copy of the recipe. Had John known of this evidence it would have undermined his belief in the conclusion that the cookies would be done in twenty minutes. In which case he would not have been justified in believing that the cookies are done or he is going to win a trip to India, which means that John did not know that he was going to win a trip to India.

Are we done? After incorporating Harman's condition into our definition of knowledge can we say that we have adequately defined knowledge as true, justified, non-defeatable, belief? Probably not, but until we can think of another counter-example that Harman's condition does not account for we can use our current definition as a working one, correct until proven otherwise. Of course, there may be alternatives to Harman's condition that would define knowledge equally well using a deferent condition. When it comes to understanding knowledge it probably could be argued that we will always have something more to say.

I refuse to pledge that I know anything, but I do pledge my honor that I am justified in believing that I have not violated the honor code while writing this paper.