Mature Science and Subjectivity

Jonah Bossewitch

PHI 321

Professor Elgin

May 5, 1993

In Scheffler's defence of the objectivity of science he never claims that science immune from subjectivity. He only shows that the three "paradoxes" encountered in the analysis of objectivity do not preclude objectivity in science, or for that matter, in any discipline. Kuhn's contention that science can never be objective is based on Kuhn's subjective analysis of history. Kuhn falls into the trap of the paradox of categorization. His observations are not "conceptually neutral", and his "categories of thought determine [his observation]." (p. 13) In other words, Kuhn went into history looking for a subjectivity in science and found it. His conclusions are meaningless if we can find another way of conceptualizing the subjectivity that he encountered in the sciences that he studied in such a way as not to preclude objectivity in all of science. Perhaps Kuhn's historical study was biased in the sense that he only analyzed the mature, well entrenched, well established sciences. However, it is possible that in the vibrant, fresh, "immature" sciences Scheffler's theoretical contention of objectivity is realized.

In effect, Scheffler and Kuhn are talking past each other and are falling into the trap of the paradox of common language. Kuhn is looking to history to disconfirm the hypothesis that emerges from Scheffler's conceptualization. However, if it can be shown that history can confirm Scheffler's conceptualization, namely, if we can justify Scheffler's hypothesis drawing on historical evidence that Kuhn overlooked, Kuhn's argument can be dismissed. Scheffler's conceptualization is not refuted by examples of subjectivity in science. All that is needed to confirm Scheffler's hypothesis is to show that objectivity is not only theoretically possible, but actually sometimes realized in practice.

Kuhn's subjectivity. Kuhn's error in analyzing the sciences is that he only looks for objectivity in the mature sciences. The subjectivity of the mature sciences is not a disconfirmation of Scheffler's theory and, in fact, upon closer inspection, may serve to confirm his theory. Many aspects of the mature sciences theoretically make it difficult for them to be objective. According to Scheffler's own theory Scheffler himself would be forced to call much of what goes nowadays on in the mature sciences subjective. In this respect, Kuhn's attack on Scheffler's work can be turned into a defence of Scheffler's conceptualization. Beyond this, by looking at the difference between the mature and the immature sciences we can find evidence for the actual objective methodology that Scheffler describes.

The paradox of common language. Scheffler enumerates various criterion that need to be fulfilled in order for science to remain objective in light of the paradoxes. Among these criterion are a "neutral court of observational appeal," (p. xi) "independent standards [that] satisfy factual requirements," (p. 1) "lay[ing] oneself open to criticism from any quarter," (p. 1) and the "sharing of evaluative criterion at the second-order level." (p. 86) Kuhn's examples from history do not satisfy these criterion, and therefore can not even be expected to live up to any standards of objectivity. The leap of logic that takes Kuhn from historically demonstrating that certain sciences do not satisfy the criterion for objectivity to asserting that no science can ever satisfy these criterion is irrational. Even if we could not find a science that ever fulfilled all of the criterion for objectivity Scheffler's theory would still be useful in practice. It warns us, and forces us to treat allegations of subjectivity seriously, as well as gives us an ideal to strive for.

It is crucial to demonstrate that Kuhn's examples are subjective exclusively because they do not fulfill Scheffler's criterion for subjectivity, since this negates the refutation of Scheffler's conceptualization that Kuhn attempts. By showing that these criterion are not realized because of factors independent Scheffler's theory a coherent picture emerges. We see the clear historical distinction between the mature and immature sciences. The immature sciences seem to fulfill Scheffler's criterion for objectivity and yet Kuhn neglects them in his analysis. The mature sciences, on the other hand, do not even fulfil the criterion for objectivity, and therefore Kuhn's finding no objectivity in them comes as no surprise.

Evaluating whether or not a discipline fulfills all of Scheffler's criterion is a difficult task well beyond the scope of this paper. However, by looking at one of the disciplines that Kuhn wrote of, we can see how a mature science fails to meet these standards.

Would Scheffler have considered physics to be objective? After his extensive education in physics it makes sense that Kuhn chooses to draw heavily from the history of physics. As the most "fundamental" and most mature sciences, it would seem that were we to find objectivity anywhere in science it would be in physics. However, it can be argued that it is this same maturity that is the cause of the loss of objectivity. The divergence of physics from philosophy, the fragmentation that has occurred within the field itself, and the manner in which subjectivity is being propagated to the future generation of physicists via the standard physics curriculum all stand as a testimony to the younger sciences of how a science can lose its objectivity. As the oldest science, with no other science's mistakes to learn from, we can understand how this lose of objectivity may have occurred. It is possible that after examining how this happened we may determine that it was unpreventable. Hopefully, this type of introspection may enable us to correct the mistakes before they become further ingrained and entrenched. At the very least we must make every effort not to allow for this loss of objectivity to occur in our fledgling sciences.

History confirms Scheffler's conceptualization of the distinction between philosophers and scientist in an interesting manner. The theoretical distinction between free form, subjective, conceptualization and rigorous, objective, hypothesis justification is confirmed in the traditionally distinct roles of the philosopher and the scientist. While it is possible for the two roles to be embodied in one individual this occurs rarely. "The pure concept is unlimited in the sense that the activity of whatever concept it chooses; it is not equally free to apply them to the given however it may please to do so." (p. 32) Historically, the philosopher's role has been to provide the conceptual framework that is necessary before any observations can be made. Philosophers pose the questions that scientists use to interpret the empirical data that they gather. As Scheffler points out "categorization provides the pigeonholes" (p. 38) and without pre-established pigeonholes it is impossible to make any observations.

In physics, the divergence of philosophy and science occurred when the scientists found that the level of rigor need to justify an observation could not efficiently be maintained using the English language. Scientists "speak" the language of mathematics in order to express rigorous, complicated, elaborate concepts efficiently. Calculus was invented by philosophers partially for this purpose and its invention marked the beginning of the separation between philosophers and physicists. While physics still required subjective conceptualization, no longer was theoretical physics a free form philosophical art. Conceptualization became bounded by the language that physicists demanded that it be expressed in. The failure of most philosophers to learn to "speak" math fluently caused philosophy to lag behind physics, and left the physicists to fend for themselves in the conceptual arena. Without the aid of pure philosophers, physicists still managed to do quite well for themselves, as many of the great minds who contributed to our modern understanding of physics managed to think freely within the boundaries imposed by mathematics. It could be argued that they thought conceptually, and developed the rigorous mathematics separately, guided by their subjective, intestable intuition. These few great men, who were able to think freely and then return to within the boundaries imposed by objectivity were responsible for what Kuhn calls the revolutions in science. However, science should not have to wait around for genius in order to make progress. As soon as physics became inaccessible to philosophers, it lost a large portion of the judges on its court of neutral appeal.

This trend of alienating judges on the court of neutral appeal has continued in physics. Currently, the most prestigious journal of physics comes out every month in six separate editions, one for each "major" branch of physics. In a recent New York Times article it was stated that the editor of that journal was recently forced to stipulate that for a paper to be published in this journal at least the first sentence of the first paragraph of every article must be comprehensible to anybody with a PhD in physics. When two physicists working in different branches of physics can no longer understand each others work it could mean that the discipline of physics is on the brink of divergence. Such a divergence would once again significantly reduce the number of people that a hypothesis must answer to, and consequently call into question whether or not the objective methodology can work when the community who can understand your work, and hopefully question it, is so limited in size.

If no one outside of the discipline can comprehend what is going on within the discipline then it is difficult to set up objective standards. The "independent standards [that] satisfy factual requirements" (p. 1) depend only on the group that establishes them. In addition, with a court of appeal of such limited size, while the discipline is theoretically "open to criticism from any quarter," (p. 1) in practice that criticism can only come from quarters that comprehend the conceptualizations and the hypothesis well enough to criticize them. As we have seen happen in physics, as a science grows and there is more knowledge to catch up with, fewer and fewer people are capable of criticism. At some point, which Scheffler does not specify, the criterion for a neutral court of appeal is no longer satisfied, and the science becomes subjective.

Scheffler does state that "the crucial matter is rather the existence of shared scientific institutions of control." (p. 87) A court that is decreasing in size is also decreasing in the number of people that share control. As soon as that control is placed in a small enough number of hands the political and sociological forces that Kuhn describes come into play. Obstinance leads to intolerance of new ideas, and without a shared control, there are no checks and balances to prevent the scenario which Kuhn describes from occurring. New ideas are suppressed and stagnation and subjectivity result. Without a sharing of control theories are held onto "stubbornly in the face of available counterinstances [and protected] from the test of experience." (p. 87)

Another aspect of mature science that is purely a function of its maturity and yet still manages to jeopardize the objectivity of the science is the fact that a scientist in a mature science is "trapped in a web of his own meanings." (p. 46) The observations are based on the context of the observations and the theories and an infantile science is virtually context free. The danger of getting "trapped in the web" is compounded when the control of the neutral court of appeal is no longer shared. While our "expectations do not wholly eliminate unexpected sights," (p. 44) unexpected sightings and the resultant "reorientations of belief" (p. 44) will occur less frequently without the necessary checks and criticisms that a younger science inherently has.

How are the immature sciences different? In sharp contrast to the well established sciences the immature sciences do not encounter many of the obstacles to objectivity that the mature sciences do. To begin with, a new science is born of philosophy. In less ambiguous terms, a new science starts with a conceptualization or abstraction that incorporates elements that no existing science has the rigor to handle. It must develop its own methodology of justification, its own common language and a new court of independent appeal. As opposed to being entrenched, a new science is free floating, and not bounded to any paradigm, for none have yet been established. None can be established until the framework for the establishment of a paradigm is in place.

For example, take the development of computer science over the past century. It could be argued that computer science began in the minds of a few mathematicians and philosophers exploring the powers of abstract machines. However, the making of a science requires more than just "free play with concepts." (p. 69) Laying the foundations of a new science involves "imposing the constraints of descriptive accuracy, theoretical coherence, and logical construction" (p. 68) on the conceptual abstraction that gave birth to the science. This initial foundation laying goes on in an environment that is easily accessible to anybody who is interested in becoming a judge on the court of neutral appeal. In addition to this collection truly independent standards, scientists involved in the new sciences need not concern themselves with "the new paradigm [losing] previously acquired problem solving ability," (p. 77) since new sciences have no existing problem solving ability. In other words, a new paradigm in a new science does not need to dislodge an old paradigm, since no old paradigms exist. This enables us not to worry about a false paradigm persisting due to preexisting momentum. We can rely on the independent standards, the diverse court of appeal, and the general skepticism of the scientific community to insure objective methodology in accepting that first paradigm of a field.

Without going into to much detail it is easy see how Scheffler's criterion for objectivity have a better chance of being satisfied in a fresh discipline than they do in an entrenched field. Until the science diverges from philosophy, all of the conceptualizations still answer to a community outside of the scientific community. Questions arising in such "diverse" areas such as consciousness, linguistics, and non- determinism still correspond closely with advances in artificial intelligence, computer architecture and algorithm research. Although with the growth of computer science will come a greater level of rigor, perhaps this rigor need not lead to a divergence as it did in physics.

A conscious effort to preserve youth. It seems as if the lesson learned in physics has not been lost on the scientists and philosophers of today. An example of this can be found by looking to one of the youngest sciences around to see how scholars are attempting to prevent a divergence from recurring. The initial conceptualization of cognitive science not only invited the free form thinkers to help in inventing the science, but consciously included them within the framework of the discipline. The cognitive studies program at Princeton incorporates this conception in practice into its framework. The cognitive scientist is defined as a psychologist/computer scientist/philosopher. In the past few decades, with developments in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence the level of rigor of the discipline has been raised. What formerly used to be subjective, intestable conceptualizations concerning perception, learning, meaning, and recognition can now rigorously be formulated into testable hypothesis. It is unlikely that with such a rapid growth of knowledge the discipline will remain unified, however, only time will tell.

A subjective conceptualization of problems manifest in the mature sciences. Somewhat tangential to the comparative exploration of the objectivity of the mature and immature sciences are the aspects of the two that provide the environment for the invention of new conceptualizations. In order to establish an atmosphere that induces creativity and imagination it is necessary to have a constant influx of new ideas. A mature science suffers when the training that the young scientists receives focuses excessively on catching up. It seems as if by spending to much time teaching people the old way of conceptualizing things you are limiting their imagination. It creates a situation where all the "new" ideas are merely rehashed versions of the old ones applied in a new way. Objectivity itself "imposes no general limitations on passion, imagination, and flair," (p. 68) however, it seems as if a mature science has the potential of stifling these traits. A new science on the other hand has no momentum, and the only thing that drives its progress is passion. In an immature science creation is truly free.

Is there hope? Beyond learning from the errors of the past and not repeating them in our new sciences, Scheffler's conceptualization along with the evidence from history allow us to objectively evaluate the objectivity of science. Examples from contemporary immature sciences seem to indicate that objectivity is possible while a science is still young. If, however, Kuhn is partially correct, and our mature sciences have lost or are losing their objectivity, we must take the necessary precautions to prevent this from happening. We need to encourage a convergence of fields, not only to promote an infusion of new ideas, but also to once again make the fields more accessible in order to have them answer to all quarters. It seems as if scientists must have a "recourse to philosophy," (p. 88) philosophers must have a recourse to science and the two groups must have a recours to a common language that will once again unite the components of science, conceptualization and hypothesis, into a coherent description. Whether or not this task can ever be accomplished in practice is almost irrelevant. Striving to realize this goal will, in a sense, achieve it.