Jonah Bossewitch	PHI 334

February 27, 1997	Prof. Soames

Analysis #1a

G. E. Moore's "Open Question" argument is a powerful technique for tapping our intuitions with regards to indefinable concepts. Moore uses this argument to demonstrate the possibility that certain concepts have an atomic nature which prevents them from being defined in terms of any other synonymous property or quality. Moore presents this argument with respect to the concept 'good', however, the Open Question argument is generally applicable to a wide variety of concepts, in the following form:

If "x is 'y' iff x is D" is a definition of 'y', then 'y' and D are synonyms
(intersubstitutable).

If 'y' and D are synonyms, the question (Q) "Granted y is D, is x 'y'?" is a trivial, self-	answering one.

If Q is never (except trivially) meaningless, then there must not exist a D that is
synonymous with 'y'.

Moore made this argument for [y = good], and concluded that aside from a few uninformative examples such as "x is 'good' iff x has intrinsic value." this question (Q) is always meaningful, so, there are no definitions of good. It is important to note that good is not the only concept that could be substituted for y, and that this exercise helps highlight a glaring hole in Moore's argument.

Moore asserts that apart from trivialities such as 'x is good iff x has intrinsic value' and 'x is good iff x ought to exist for its own sake' there are no definitions of x that make (Q) vacuous. The trouble is that this argument provides no procedure for determining if there exists some non-trivial D such that (Q) is self-answering. Of course, Moore can insist that his argument shifts the burden of proof to the naturalists, who must now produce such a D to defeat Moore's claim, however, it is still possible that such a D does exist, it's just that nobody has ever thought of it. In other words, the Open Question argument describes one of the properties of an atomic concept, namely that it is always meaningful to ask "Is x 'y'?" when y is atomic. However, Moore's argument does not provide a any procedure, aside from intuition, which determines whether or not such a y exists. In this respect the argument is fundamentally inconclusive—it can tell you with certainty that a concept is definable, but it will always leave a lingering doubt as to a concept's indefinability.

It is hard to detect this fallacy in the case of [y = good], since in this case Moore expresses a claim which certainly seems correct, and with which many agree. However, as we substitute other terms for y aside from good, the intuitions which guided our analysis of good are no longer as strong. For example, let [y = funny]:

If "x is 'funny' iff x is D" is a definition of 'funny', then 'funny' and D are synonyms.

If 'funny' and D are synonyms, The question (Q) "Granted funny is D, is x 'funny'?"	is a trivial, self-answering one.

If Q is never (except trivially) meaningless, then there must not exist a D that is	synonymous with 'funny'.

The challenge in this instance of the Open Question argument is that it is unclear whether or not there might exist a some non-trivial D which is synonymous with funny, or in other words a definition of funny which provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for x to be funny. This example demonstrates the difficulty in applying the Open Question argument to practical matters where we cannot rule out on a priori grounds the possibility that there does exist some D which is intersubstitutable with 'y'.

Which brings us to the great debate between Moore and W. D. Ross concerning the definablity of the concept 'right.' In contrast to 'good' Moore does believe that 'right' is definable since (Q) is not an open question when [y = right]. Moore attempts to define the D corresponding to [y = right] by pointing out that "'right' does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a good result', and is thus identical with 'useful'" (Principia Ethica, p. 147) Ross accuses Moore of falling for the same naturalistic fallacy that Moore accuses others of making with the term good.	As Ross understands Moore, the statement "x is D" must be an analytic proposition, and furthermore, any analytical proposition is obviously true to anybody.

"While it may be true that the only things that are good are pleasant, the statement that the good is just the pleasant is a synthetic, not an analytic proposition; if this were not so, it would not be intelligible that the proposition 'the good is just the pleasant' should have been maintained on the one hand and denied on the other, with so much fervor; for we do not fight for or against analytic propositions; we take them for granted." (The Right and the Good, pp. 8-9)

Ross's interpretation of the Open Question argument is problematic because of the restriction that he places upon the type of propositions that can serve to define x. Given his position concerning the obviousness of analytical propositions1, it is plausible that he insisted upon "x is D" being analytic in order to partially solve the problem posed above. Instead of showing that D exists such that "x is D", Ross only needs to show that no analytic proposition of the form "x is D" exists, sparing him some, but not all, of the worry that there may be a D out there of which he has not thought. The trouble with this move is that it seems quite plausible that Moore would have admitted synthetic propositions of the form "x is D" as long as D was intersubstitutable with y. For example, if we could construct a definition of 'water' along the lines of "a collection of H2O molecules in liquid state" it might constitute a viable D even though it is clearly a synthetic proposition (water could have been made of some other molecules, and we could only discover this fact through empirical investigation). This seems to suggest that we cannot reject Moore's analysis of 'right' simply on the grounds that it is synthetic.

What we need to show in order to demonstrate that Moore's definition of 'right' is not satisfactory is either one (or both) of two things: (a) That it suffers from the sin of omission— Some x are right, but are not included by the conditions stipulated in D. (b) That it suffers from the sin of commission—Some x are not right, but are included in the conditions stipulated in D.

Is there anything that is right that is not the cause of a good result? Take for example the game of backgammon. Often in backgammon you are faced with a move that places you in jeopardy, but promises a tidy payoff if the dice gods are merciful. In these situations it might turn out that you made the right move, but your opponent got lucky which resulted in a bad event (for you). This toy example shows that Moore's definition suffers from omission. Is there anything that causes a good result that is not the result of something done right? In the very same game of backgammon, a player might also make a terrible move which by a quirk of fate results in him winning the game. Such a case seems to be an example of a wrong action that accidentally results in a good outcome, showing that Moore's definition suffers from commission as well. In these examples I have purposefully avoided morally loaded cases, such as fulfilling a promise that results in a bad outcome etc. to isolate the flaw in Moore's definition with minimal value judgments.

Without a D that withstands this type of criticism it appears that Moore's own Open Question argument can successfully be applied to the concept of 'right' in a manner analogous to his application of the argument to the concept 'good'. Since we are left without a satisfactory D, the (Q) turns out to be meaningful as far as we currently know. While some might be troubled by the indefinability of 'right', Moore himself could have used the same argument that he used with 'good' to eliminate our worry about the indefinability of 'right'.

"If on the other hand, we once recognize that we must start our Ethics without a definition, we shall be much more apt to look around us, before we adopt any ethical principle whatsoever; and the more we look about us the less likely we are to find a false one." (Principia Ethica, p. 20)

Our inability to define ethical terms in Moore's sense of definability should not threaten our conviction of the power, significance, and meaning of such terms. Even outside the sphere of ethics we would hard pressed to formulate a Moorian definition of many concepts. Concepts such as identity, game, heap, and lamppost have all withstood an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and yet most of us do not doubt their existence, and even fewer have difficulty using them meaningfully in a sentence. Moore's standards of definition may be too stringent for all but a few concepts, but at least he has taught us not to engage in a fruitless search for an illusory goal which will accomplish nothing except limit our imagination. In summary, despite of the fact that Ross's criticism of Moore slightly misses the mark, his conclusion that 'right' is indefinable, in the same way that good is indefinable, is right on target. However, those concerned that we will now have no idea what we ought to be doing next, will be comforted to learn that we have as little an idea now as we did before this conclusion. Moore's argument seems to be more powerful than even he anticipated, and although it does not conclusively inform us that there is no definition for 'good' or 'right', it warns us not to hold our breath, for there is no good reason to think that there is a right definition for either of these concepts.

I pledge my honor that I did the right thing and did not violate the honor code in writing this paper, which will inevitably result in a good outcome.

Jonah Bossewitch