Freud's Repression

Jonah Bossewitch

PSY 365

Professor Sugarman

October 19, 1995

Freud first introduced the concept of repression in his 1915 article Instincts and Their Vicissitudes. In this article Freud lists "Repression" as one of the four vicissitudes that an instinct may undergo. We are given a clue that repression is not as simple as the other vicissitudes when learn that Freud has decided to treat repression in a "special chapter to itself.1" (p. 91) However, it is doubtful that even Freud himself could have predicted that repression was to become the testing grounds for his entire mental topography.

Freud defines an instinct as a "stimulus to the mind" that arises "from within the organism itself," and "always (acts) as a constant force." (pp. 84-85) All instincts can also be described in terms of their various components including their impetus, aim, object, and source. As we shall see, in certain instances an instinct may be stripped of its object, resulting in an idea and a charge of affect. In addition to the instincts, Freud also postulates a set of four transformations that may operate on the instincts in accordance with the pleasure principle. These transformations, or vicissitudes, are: Reversal into its opposite, Turning round upon the subject, Repression, and Sublimation. From the start Freud recognized the complexity of repression and allocated an entirely separate article to its explanation.

In the beginning of his article on repression Freud states that "the essence of repression lies simply in the function of rejecting something and keeping it out of consciousness." (p. 105) However, in spite of Freud's use of the term "simply", repression is everything but simple. First of all, this definition of repression presupposes a mental topography that sharply distinguishes between the Cs and the Uncs. Even once this distinction is clearly mapped out, other questions remain. Why are instincts repressed in the first place? "Who" does the repressing? Does the Cs (or pre-consciousness (Pcs)) actively censor out instincts/ideas, or does the Uncs actively keep the instincts/ideas outside of Cs? Must we assume that repression is always the result of an active process? How is the repressed idea kept repressed?

Although Freud was convinced that repression existed based on his clinical experience, he was extremely puzzled by it. According to his preexisting theory, the gratification of instincts by definition brings about satisfaction. Consequently, repression seems to be acting in direct violation of the pleasure principle. If Freud's previous claim that the mind operates according to the pleasure principle is correct, why should any instinct ever be repressed?

Freud grapples with this apparent contradiction by reminding us that although it is true that all instincts obey the pleasure principle, some may still offend the Cs by eliciting an unpleasant affect. In this sense, repression is an agent of the reality principle, policing against instincts that bring pleasure at too great a cost. "As soon as an idea which is fundamentally offensive exceeds a certain degree of strength, the conflict takes on actuality, and it is precisely activation of the idea that leads to its repression." (p. 109)

Repression has a number of tactics at its disposal in order to achieve its goal of keeping an item out of Cs. Furthermore, repression operates "in a highly specific manner in each instance; every single derivative of the repressed may have its peculiar fate". First, the repression may split the affect from the idea (or the object) which made the original instinct. Since an affect can not exist freely, another idea will take the place of the original. Before this new association is formed, the affect may be transformed in one of three ways: "(1) either it remains, wholly or in part, as it is; (2) or it is transformed into a qualitatively different change of affect, above all into anxiety; (3) or it is suppressed, i.e. its development is hindered all together." (p. 127)

Even after an object is expelled from Cs the repression process is not complete. The expelled object very likely has remaining energy that survived the transformation. This energy will power another assault on Cs, so unless some sort of sentry is posted at the gates of Cs the expelled object will just waltz right back in. To guard against this inevitability Freud posits an anti-cathexis "by means of which the system Pcs guards itself against the intrusion of the unconscious idea." (p. 129) Since the "resistance of consciousness against them was in inverse proportion to their remoteness from what was originally repressed" (p. 107) derivatives of the repression process may often enter consciousness without a problem.

It is obvious to any casual observer that there are some ideas present in their minds of which we are not aware. The question is whether or not the principle that governs the interaction of these ideas operates according to the story that Freud tells us. Anybody that has ever learned how to perform a motor task has watched as control of the actions recedes from consciousness and becomes automatic. This type of data is enough to roughly confirm Freud's conception of the boundary between the Cs and the Uncs. However, do we need to believe in the animate dynamics between these systems that Freud describes?

According to Freud, repression proper occurs when an offensive idea actually enters Cs and is then expelled into the Uncs.. It is difficult to understand how an idea can be successfully repressed once it has entered Cs unless the repressive process also erases any memory traces from Cs. Perhaps it is partially because of this complication that Freud introduced the Pcs. Once the Pcs has been introduced the repressive force may intercept the idea before it actually becomes conscious. This eliminates the need for the repressive force to erase the memory trace of the original infiltration since the idea never actually became conscious. But is this the only way that repression can be modeled?

What if we imagine that Cs is more like a searchlight than an antechamber, and whatever is illuminated by the searchlight enters Cs. In this model the instinct takes on a more passive role (and a less bizarre one) as one of the citizens of the Uncs netherworld. Should an offensive idea ever enter the beam of Cs "expulsion" would be accomplished by simply shining somewhere else. In this schema ideas are not kicked out of Cs so much as Cs moves away from the idea. As another alternative, what if after the initial expulsion the Uncs actively restrained the repressed idea instead of the Cs constantly repelling it with an anti-cathexis? In this scenario the Uncs might be "motivated" to transform the idea so it could sneak past Cs and be responsible for some of the transformational effects that have been attributed to the repressive force. Freud himself was sensitive to these types of considerations as we learn in The Ego and the Id. "Do (the displaced mental energies) advance to the surface, which causes consciousness to be generated? Or does Consciousness make its way to them?" (p. 12) In fact, the complications that repression created were troublesome enough to force Freud into reconfiguring his entire mental topography2.

In light of these doubts, the real puzzle of repression is not weather or why it happens, but how it happens. The concept of repression was formulated at a time when "mental topography had... nothing to do with anatomy." (p. 124) In other words, repression is an abstract concept that only exists within the context of an abstract model of the human mind. It does not necessarily correspond to any neurochemical process going on inside the brain. It is simply one way of modeling the causes of a certain set of behaviors that Freud observed in his patients. Therefore, within the context of the psychoanalytic model, repression certainly does exist and proved to be a more fundamental concept than the Cs/Uncs distinction. When one of the two had to go, Freud got rid of the Cs/Uncs distinction, not repression. Although there may be other explanations of the same set of behaviors, they need not contradict the repression/psychoanalytic model. In this sense, repression is very real within the context of psychoanalysis and as a model may continue to coexist simultaneously with competing models of the same phenomenon.

Nowadays, like much of Freud's terminology, "repression" has become a part of everyday vocabulary. Most people easily accept the notion that there may be some instincts that are not making it to their consciousness to be expressed. However, it is doubtful that most people who use the term recognize its full implications. Repression according to Freud's first account involves Unconscious battles between various forces, whose casualties are symptoms in the individual undergoing this repression. Freud's original version of repression was so difficult to concieve that after a while not even he bought it. His later version which invokes the ego, the id, and the superego seems a more plausible account, if your willing to accept this new breakdown of the mind. At the very least, the concept of repression has served as a catalyst for countless dialogues concerning the nature of mental life. Furthermore, it has served as the cornerstone upon which Freud rebuilt his mental topology. Whether or not the repression model accurately describes what is going on below the unconscious barriers of the mind, Freud unquestionably pioneered a very powerful concept that is still being invoked today.